State of Utah v. Kendall Rosell Swenson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
State of Utah v. Kendall Rosell Swenson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Attorney Generals Office; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
David M. Perry; Attorney for Appellant; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Swenson, No. 20080243 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/793
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff Appcike 
vs. * Appellate Case No. 20080243-CA 
* 
KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON * 
Defendant / Appellant * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THIS APPEAL IS FROM MOTIONS AND A TRIAL HELD IN THE I IRS I 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. THE HONORABLE GORDON J. LOW 
PRESIDED OVER THE CASE. 
APPELLANT IS CURRENTLY INCARCERATED IN THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON. 
APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT 
Attorney Generals Office 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
David M. Perry, #5410 
Attorney for Appellant 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (-135) 753-5933 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 1 1 2008 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff/ Appellee * 
vs. * Appellate Case No. 20080243-CA 
* 
KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON * 
Defendant / Appellant * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THIS APPEAL IS FROM MOTIONS AND A TRIAL HELD IN THE FIRST 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. THE HONORABLE GORDON J. LOW 
PRESIDED OVER THE CASE. 
APPELLANT IS CURRENTLY INCARCERATED IN THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON. 
APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT 
Attorney Generals Office David M. Perry, #5410 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor Attorney for Appellant 
P.O. Box 140854 Logan, Utah 84321 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 Telephone: (435) 753-5933 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES HI 
UTAH ST A'J'|i' CASES HI 
JIIKIShK TiniN SNI> N \ II IHI< OK PROCEEDINGS 1 
uNS, STATUTES, AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF CASE 4 
STATi v 4 
Nli|>r>* • •" *' \RG^ITXI^NT 7 
\k< I M E M 8 
iS^UE i. i ; iu m i • • • ni i;\ IAEK< ss, . K;-:-»: :;•• <\ . 
THE DEEENDAN ; ' ' ) J 01 I ()W : vi '• i'1-u •« > j *•  R j \ • \ n 
VIOLATE TUT V i u i IUING PROVISIONS. 
ISSUE II. DID l"HK COURT ERROR IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
THAT LINKED THE DEFENDANT TO THE CRIME 
( >N< IHSION 21 
ADDENDUM 24 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH STATE CASES 
State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d. 1296 (Utah App. 1991) 2 
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992) 2 
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994) 2 
Statev. itam/Vez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991) 2 
Statev. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1271 (Utah 1993) 2 
State v. F/gz7, 815 p.2d 1296, 1298 (Utah App. 1991) 2 
Statev. Stilling, 770P.2d 137, 140 (Utah 1989) 9,13,16 
Utah v.Friedman 001917540 8 
Gibson v. Morris, 646 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1982) 15 
Hearn v. State, 642 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982) 15 
Statev. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986) 20 
UTAH STATE STATUTES 
U.C.A. 76-6-202 BURGLARY 3 
Utah Code Arnotated § 78A-4-103(2)(j) 2 
U.C.A. 76-6-106 CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 3 
U.C.A. 58-37A-5(l) POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 3 
U.C.A 76-6-404 THEFT 3 
U.C.A. 76-6-408 THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY 3 
U.C.A. 76-6-205 UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS 3 
iii 
Utah Code Ann. §§77-29-5 through 77-29-11 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-7 10 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
Fifth Amendment 18 
Fourteenth Amendment 18 
Fourth Amendment 8, 19, 20 
FEDERAL CASES 
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 354 - 357, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1844 - 1846 
(1978) 9,14 
M United States Ex Rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 835 (3d Cir. 1975)auro, 436 
U.S. 350 - 357, 98 S.Ct. 1842 - 1845 10, 13, 16 
United States Ex Rel. Hollemanv. Duckworth, 592 F.Supp. 1423 10 
United States v. Sorrell, 413 F.Supp. 138, 140, (E.D. Penn. 1976), affd. 562 F.2d 227, 
cert, denied 436 U.S. 949, 98 S.Ct. 2858 12,16 
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981) 13 
Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967) 17 
Adams v. Cuyler, 592 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1979) 13 
White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1930) 15 
U.S. Ex Rel. Holleman v. Duckworth, 592 F.Supp. at 1430 16 
United States v. Reed, 620 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1980) cert denied 449 U.S. 880, 101 S.Ct. 
229, L.Ed.2d 104 (10/6/80) 17 
Hopper v. United States Parole Com'n, 702 842 (9th Cir. 1983) 18 
United States v. Johnson, 953, 1167,1170-71 (9th Cir. 1992) 19 
United States v. Schrum, 638 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1981) 17 
iv 
Marylane v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) 19 
Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 1994) 9 
Lowery V. Estelle, 696 F.2d 333 (5th cir. 1983) 18 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) 20 
Hiibelv. Sixth Judicial 542 U.S. 177(2004) 20 
v 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/ Appellee 
vs. 
KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON 
Defendant / Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the District Court's denying two motions filed by the 
defendant. The first motion deals with the Courts failure to suppress certain evidence 
obtained by the State in violation of his fourth amendment. The second motion deals 
with the Courts denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant. 
The defendant posted bail on his State charges. The Cache County jail would not release 
him. Two days later the U.S. Marshall's office place a federal detainer on Mr. Swenson. 
Mr. Swenson was not released from jail when he posted bail. There rational for not 
releasing him is the Federal Government was seeking to detain him. The defendant was 
therefore in Federal custody. The State of Utah failed to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Prosequendum transferring the defendant to the State Courts system. 
The defendant was charged with ten crimes: one count of possession of controlled 
substance, a second degree felony; two counts of burglary, both third degree felonies; two 
counts of criminal mischief, one third degree felony and one class A misdemeanor; one 
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count of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; one count of theft, a third degree 
felony; two counts of theft by receiving stolen property, both third degree felonies; and 
one count of possession of burglary tools, a class B misdemeanor. 
The defendant was convicted of Five Third Degree felonies and two 
misdemeanors. The Court sentenced the defendant to zero to five years one each of the 
Third degree felonies and on the Class A misdemeanor to 365 days in jail and on the 
Class B misdemeanor to 180 days in jail. The Court ordered the sentences to run 
concurrent. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. 78A-4-103(2)(J) 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The trial court should have granted the defendants motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction, failure to follow IAD procedures, and violation of the Anti-shuttling 
provisions. The Court should review its legal conclusions for correctness. State v. 
Vigil 815 P.2d. 1296 (Utah App. 1991) 
2. The trial court erred when they denied the defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence. 
The Court should review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
in a bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and factual determinations under a 
clearly erroneous standard and reviewing its legal conclusions for correctness. See 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Vigil, 815 
p.2d 1296, 1298 (Utah App. 1991). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.C.A. 76-6-202 BURGLARY, 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony: 
(b) theft:... 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, 
in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
U.C.A. 76-6-106 CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 
A person commits criminal mischief if the person intentionally damages, defaces, 
or destroys the property of another. 
U.C.A. 58-37A-5(l) POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA. 
A person is in possession of drug paraphernalia if he did knowingly, intentionally 
or recklessly use or possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, 
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, 
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce 
a controlled substance into the human body. 
U.C.A 76-6-404 THEFT. 
A person commits theft if he obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the 
property of another with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the actor has been 
twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or any burglary with the intent to commit 
theft. 
U.C.A. 76-6-408 THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY 
A person commits theft by receiving stolen property if he received, retained or 
disposed of property of another, knowing that the property had been stolen or believing 
that it probably had been stolen, or concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, 
selling or withholding the property, knowing the property had been stolen, intending to 
deprive the owner thereof, and the value of said property was or exceeded $1,000.00, but 
was less than $5,000.00 or the defendant had been twice before convicted of theft, 
robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit theft. 
U.C.A. 76-6-205 UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS, 
A person commits this if he had in his possession an instrument, tool, device, 
article, or other thing adapted, designed, or commonly used in advancing or facilitating 
the commission of any offense, under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or 
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knowledge th*t some person intends to use the same in the commission of a burglary or 
theft. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
The appellant was charged by way of information with ten counts. R. 147. 
He filed a motion to suppress evidence of the search of his vehicle without probable 
cause R. 094 and a motion to dismiss based upon a violation of the Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers (hereinafter IAD) for the State's failure to obtain a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Prosequendum prior to bringing the appellant to State court when he was in the custody 
of the Federal Government. R. 090. Both these motions were denied R. 349. The 
defendant proceeded to have a jury trial. At the trial the defendant was convicted of eight 
counts. R. 237 and prior to sentencing, he re-filed another motion contesting the transfer 
to the State Court when he was in custody of the Federal Government. R. 256. This 
motion was also denied R. 312. 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. On August 17, 2006 Officer Hansen was dispatched to investigate an intrusion 
alarm at the Top Stop Service Station in Logan, Utah. R. 349. 
2. As he was parking his car, he noticed a male running towards him (later 
determined to be the defendant). He asked the male what he was doing and he 
replied he was out for a jog. Officer Hansen walked a few steps and observed 
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that the North door to the store had the lock broken off. Officer Hansen also 
saw an axe, a large crowbar, a pair of gloves, and a ball cap. He did not enter 
the building. R. 349. 
The officer turned and observed a large semi-truck with a car carrier trailer 
attached to it. The vehicle was running and he observed the same male 
standing on the running board. The interior light was on. R. 349 P. 18. 
The officer began to walk toward the truck and the male got down from the 
truck and the interior light turned off. The officer pulls out his tazer and 
detains the male and orders him to sit down as he was unsure at that point if he 
might be involved in the possible burglary. R. 349 P. 19. 
The defendant tells the officer to not search his truck. R. 349 P 28. 
However, the officer searches the defendant's truck. He shines his flashlight in 
the truck and puts his hand holding the flashlight through the open window of 
the truck. R. 349 P. 29. He locates a glove between the driver's seat and door 
that could not be seen without entering the vehicle. 
The officer supposedly saw a blue glove that was similar to the one at the Top 
Stop. He further finds a chop saw which was later determined was used to saw 
open an ATM machine located in the Top Stop. He then formally detains the 
suspect for involvement in the burglary. R. 349. 
On August 17, 2006, the State of Utah charged the defendant by way of 
information. R. 001. The defendant posted bail in the amount of $57,407.00 
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and was released. R 19. He was then arrested in Salt Lake City, Utah and 
missed his August 28, 2006 hearing. 
9. On Augusts 28, 2006, the Court issues a no bail warrant for the defendant. R. 
311. 
10. On September 11, 2006 the defendant appears and the Court reinstates the 
defendant's bail of $57,407.00 that he had previously posted. R. 311. Cache 
County Jail does not release the defendant. R. 244. P5. He is being held 
pursuant to a Federal hold. R. 244 P. 5 This federal detainer is not received by 
the Cache County jail until September 13, 2006. R. 262. 
11. On September 13, 2006 a hold is placed on the defendant by the U.S. 
Ma-shalls. R. 262. 
12. On September 19, 2006 a motion to continue the preliminary hearing is made 
and the defendant was transported to the First Judicial Court from the Cache 
Coi.nty jail by sheriffs deputies. The Court had not issued a writ of Habeas 
Corpus prosequendum to bring the defendant out of the primary custody of the 
Federal Government to a State proceeding.(hereinafter "Writ") 
13. On September 21, 2006 the Court holds a preliminary hearing and the 
defendant is bond over to answer to the charges. The State brings the 
defendant to court from Federal Custody without a "Writ" 
14. On October 17, 2006, the Court heard arguments on various motions filed by 
the defendant. The Court denied all of the defendant's motions. R. 349. The 
defendant is transported from Federal custody without a "Writ". 
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15. On October 18, 19, 2006, a trial was held and the defendant was convicted of 
eight counts. He was transported from Federal custody without a "Writ". 
16. Prior to sentencing the defendant filed another motion to dismiss because the 
State failed to comply with the IAD act. R. 256. The Court denied this motion. 
R.312. 
17. The defendant was sentenced on March 14, 2007 and committed to the Utah 
State Prison for a term of zero to five years to run concurrent. He was brought 
to Court without a "Writ". The Court ordered that this sentence run concurrent 
with his Federal Sentence. R. 344. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The appellant asserts that the Trial Court erred in not dismissing the charges 
against him. Once the defendant's bail was reinstated by the Judge on September 11, 
2006 the defendant was no longer in the primary custody of the State of Utah but is in the 
primary custody of the U.S. Marshall. Any further prosecution of the defendant in the 
State system should have been instituted by the State either by filing a detainer on the 
defendant or filing a writ of Habeas Corpus prosequendum (hereinafter "writ"). The 
State failed to do either of these after they relinquished primary custody of the defendant 
when he posted bail. 
This is a case of first impression in the State of Utah. The District Court was 
wrong in not complying with the IAD. 
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Furthermore, the defendant's case was compromised when the Court failed to 
suppress evidence that was obtained illegally without a search warrant or probable cause 
in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court should have granted the defendants motion to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction, failure to follow IAD procedures, and violation of anti-
shuttling procedures. 
The Appellant Court should dismiss the instant case. There is precedent for 
dismissing the charges against Mr. Swenson. In State of Utah v. Friedman, 001917540 
The State filed no detainer or writ in order to obtain Mr. Friedman in State custody for 
prosecution of his case. 
On March 2, 2001 Mr. Friedman argued, pursuant to filing a Motion to Dismiss for 
violation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers, that the State failed to follow correct 
procedures in bringing him from federal jurisdiction. See Addendum "F". This Court 
ruled that while the State might have failed to follow procedures, Mr. Friedman's remedy 
lay in federal court. Mr. Friedman pursued habeas corpus in federal court. On May 18, 
2001, the Hon. Bruce Jenkins ruled that the Uniled States has primary custody which 
began February 13, 2000 and continues. The Hon. Jenkins directed the State to obtain 
writs for further hearings on this matter. The motion to dismiss was re-filed in District 
Court after a trial was held and the Honorable Judge Hanson dismissed all the State's 
charges. 
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The State clearly failed to follow appropriate procedures to bring Mr. Swenson into 
the First Judicial Court of Utah on the instant charges. The State lacked custody over Mr. 
Swenson, and the First District Court lacked jurisdiction for every hearing in which Mr. 
Swenson appeared without the proper "writ" being filed by the State beforehand. The 
repeated transport of Mr. Swenson to court prior to trial also violated anti-shuttling 
provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. In any case, dismissal with 
prejudice was the appropriate remedy. The trial court erred by not requiring the State to 
follow the proper procedures. 
A. The State Violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. 
1. The State Had a Statutory Duty to Follow the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers. 
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, which Utah adopted at Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-29-5 throi $h 77-29-11 (1953 as amended)(hereinafter? "IAD5') governs the custody of 
prisoners whc are charged in more than one jurisdiction at a time. The IAD sets 
protocols for i *ansfers of custody between jurisdictions. The IAD applies to prisoners in 
federal custody just as if they are prisoners of IAD-signing states. Art. 11(a); United 
States v . M a u q 436 U.S. 340, 354 - 357, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1844 - 1846 (1978); See also, 
Dunne v. Keohane, 14F.3d335 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying IAD to prisoner with state and 
federal sentences). 
The State had a duty to follow the procedures set forth by the IAD. The IAD was 
enacted for the benefit of prisoners and for the benefit of states seeking to try prisoners 
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held in other jurisdictions. State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah 1989); See, 
generally, Mauro, 436 U.S. 350 - 357, 98 S.Ct. 1842 -1845. The IAD applies to all of 
the States signing and incorporating IAD into its laws. United States Ex Rel. Esola v. 
Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 835 (3d Cir. 1975). As such, 
[t]he Agreement cannot be viewed as a single enactment by a single 
legislative body. Rather it is a law binding on at least two sovereigns as far 
as this case is concerned. Rights arising under the Agreement flow from 
the joint actions of both of the party jurisdictions. 
Id. at 835. 
The IAD addresses very serious problems which prevailed under the 
previous informal and varying state practices with respect to detainers. Not 
only did the former detainer practices result in serious infringement of 
prisoners' rights, but they also substantially impeded prison official's 
ability to use the period of incarceration to rehabilitate prisoners. 
United States Ex Rel. Holleman v. Duckworth, 592 F.Supp. 1423, 1430 (N.D. 111. 1984), 
rev'd on other grounds, 770 F.2d 690, cert denied 474 U.S. 1069, 106 S.Cl. 828 (1985) 
(citations omitted). 
Besides the State's duties as a signing state to follow the IAD procedures, the 
State's own statutes require adherence to IAD procedures. 
All courts, departments, agencies, officers and employees of this state 
and its political subdivisions are hereby directed to enforce the agreement 
on detainers and to cooperate with one another and with other party states 
in enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-7. 
The IAD makes it relatively easy for officials in an IAD-signing state to obtain, for 
prosecution, a prisoner from another IAD-signing state. The IAD sets out requirements 
for states seeking to "borrow" a prisoner in the custody of one state (or in federal 
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custody) for prosecution in another state (or in federal court). Rather than reprinting the 
IAD, a copy is hereto attached as Addendum "G." The IAD provides that any state 
where there is an untried Information pending against the prisoner of another state or the 
federal government, it is entitled to have the prisoner made available for prosecution. 
IAD Art. IV(a). First, the state seeking jurisdiction (the "receiving state55) must file an 
Information. IAD, Art. 111(a). Then, the receiving state must lodge a detainer against the 
prisoner. IAD, Art. 111(a). The receiving state may alternatively file writ of habeas 
corpus ad prosequendum in order to obtain the prisoner. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 362 - 365. 
The original jurisdiction, the "sending state,55 where the prisoner is serving a sentence 
must deliver the prisoner with written notice of his request for final disposition and a 
certificate showing how much time the prisoner has left on his original sentence. Id. 
When the prisoner is served with the detainer he is given notice of the detainer and 
of his right to a speedy disposition and is provided with forms to give notice to the 
prosecutor of the receiving state of his request for disposition within one hundred and 
eighty (180) days. IAD Art. 111(a). The warden is to inform the prisoner of all detainers 
and of his right to request final disposition within 180 days. IAD Art. III(c). The 
sending state shall send along with the prisoner's disposition request a certificate showing 
how much time is left on the prisoner's sentence in the sending state. Id. The prisoner's 
request for disposition consents to have his person produced in the court where the 
detainer and untried information was filed. IAD Art. 111(e). Trial is to be commenced 
within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the prisoner arriving in the receiving state 
or the case must be dismissed, although continuances may be granted. IAD Art. IV(c). If 
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the receiving tate does not conduct trial prior to returning the prisoner to the sending 
state, the untried information in the receiving state shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
IAD Art. IV(e). 
Article V sets forth means by which the IAD is enforced. It reiterates the receiving 
states9 rights to obtain prisoners (IAD Art. V(a)) and sets forth the proper way to send the 
various documents. Article V further provides that where the receiving state refuses or 
fails to accept temporary custody of the prisoner, or where the case is not brought to trial 
within the Art. Ill or Art. IV time limits, the information is to be dismissed with 
prejudice. IAD Art. V(c). During the time that the receiving state conducts its trial, the 
prisoner's sentence in the sending state continues to run. IAD Art. V(f). Courts are to 
liberally construe the IAD "so as to effectuate its purposes." IAD Art. IX. 
Following the IAD procedures is the ONLY way that a prisoner may be brought 
from one jurisdiction to answer charges in another jurisdiction. In United States v. 
Sorrell the Eastern District of Pennsylvania said: 
We see no room for doubt that at least in this circuit, the Agreement is 
the exclusive method for transfer of a state prisoner to another state 
(including, under the Agreement, the United States) for any phase of the 
prosecution in the transferee state. 
United States v. SorrelK 413 F.Supp. 138, 140, (E.D. Perm. 1976), affd. 562 F.2d 227, 
cert, denied 436 U.S. 949, 98 S.Ct. 2858. 
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In United States Ex Rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d at 832, a prisoner was 
transferred between state and federal jurisdictions "by unspecified procedures." In 
Esola, some but not all of the transfers were accomplished by means of writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Id. at 836. In ruling that the IAD's anti-
shuttling provisions applied to the Esola defendant, the Third Circuit ruled that the 
IAD provides the exclusive means of transferring prisoners between jurisdictions. 
Esola at 837; followed, Adams v. Cuvler, 592 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(holding that prisoners entitled to pre-existing procedural protections in addition to 
IAD) aff d Cuvler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). 
In an exhaustive review of federal cases, many courts have excused various 
procedural failures for various reasons, but no court has ever excused a complete 
failure by the receiving state to file a detainer or obtain a writ of habeas corpus 
prior to obtaining a prisoner for prosecution of untried charges. 
The Utah Supreme Court rulings also require the State to comply with the 
IAD. In State v. Stilling, the Utah Supreme Court held that the where the trial 
court ordered a prisoner from Oregon returned to Oregon (even though the State 
had filed a detainer), the return was proper because Salt Lake County "was 
required to comply with IAD provisions," and it had never previously "sought nor 
received authority of the Oregon officials to dispose of the charges." Stilling, 770 
P.2d at 142. 
2. The State Did Not Follow IAD Procedures. 
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In the instant case, the State failed to follow IAD protocols. When the State 
arrested Mr. Swenson in 2006, he was properly in the State's custody. However, 
when his bail was reinstated he should have been released from jail. However the 
U.S. Marshall placed a hold on him. At this point in time he is now in primary 
custody of the Federal Government. 
The State failed to follow the IAD in several ways. First, when the federal 
government sought jurisdiction over Mr. Swenson for prosecution of the burglary 
case, the State failed to file the Art. Ill required certificate showing the amount of 
time left on his State sentence. The State failed to file any detainer to secure Mr. 
Swenson r?turn. The State continued to bring Mr. Swenson to Court on the instant 
charges agiinst Mr. Swenson but did not ever file any detainer against him or 
obtain a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to obtain him from federal 
custody. 
B. This Court Should Dismiss This Action. 
Dismissal is a proper remedy for failure to follow IAD procedures. The IAD 
directs dismissal with prejudice anytime a receiving state fails to bring a case to 
trial within IAD time limits (IAD Art. 111(a) and Art. IV(c)), fails to accept 
temporary custody (IAD Art. V(c)), or where the prisoner is returned to the 
sending state without trial (IAD Art. IV(e) - this is the "anti-shuttling" provision). 
These proA isions shows legislative intent that IAD-signing states follow IAD 
procedures and that dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate procedure when the 
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receiving state fails to follow IAD procedures. Further, this Court may not have 
had jurisdiction to proceed on this matter. 
The IAD provides in statute two separate reasons for dismissing this action. 
First, by failing to follow IAD procedures, the State effectively failed to accept 
legitimate temporary custody of Mr. Swenson. The State's failure to file any 
detainer or obtain a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum amounts to a waiver 
of jurisdiction or a procedural defect tantamount to such a waiver. The State 
lacked proper jurisdiction to try the instant case because the State failed to ever get 
authority from the federal government to transfer Mr. Swenson into the State's 
temporary custody for resolution of these charges. C£, Gibson v. Morris, 646 
P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1982). 
The State could never have reasonably expected to keep primary custody 
over Mr. Swenson after delivering him to federal custody. While a prisoner is 
made available for trial in the receiving state, his original sentence in the sending 
state continues to run. IAD Art. V(f). A "prisoner cannot be required to serve his 
sentence in installments." Hearn v. State, 642 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982) (citing 
Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967) and White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788 
(10th Cir. 1930)). In Shields v. Beto. 370 F.2d, 1005 - 1006, the lack of the 
sending state's interest in the prisoner exhibited by the sending state's failure to 
file a detainer was deemed a pardon and waiver of jurisdiction. Where the sending 
State in the instant case relinquished custody to the federal government for trial 
15 
but filed no detainer to secure Mr. Swenson's return, his release to federal custody 
amounted to a waiver of jurisdiction. 
Even where IAD violations do not quite rise to the level of jurisdictional 
defects, "they still resemble jurisdictional defects, because they go not to the 
question of how a defendant should be tried, but instead to the question of whether 
the defendant should be tried at all." U.S. Ex Rel. Holleman v. Duckworth, 592 
F.Supp. at 1430. The Court should have dismissed this case because 1he case 
should never have gone forward without the State following the statutorily 
mandated procedures for bringing Mr. Swenson to court. 
If the State claims that somehow the IAD does not apply to this case, then 
this Court should wonder skeptically about what legal mechanism brought Mr. 
Swenson into this Court. 
In the Friedman case, Judge Jenkins ruled that Mr. Friedman has been in 
federal custody since February 2000, legally, he was not here and the pretrial and 
trial appearances were, for all legal purposes, an illusion. All the court 
appearances for Mr. Swenson, for all legal purposes, are an illusion. 
Second, the State violated on numerous occasions the IAD Art. IV(e) anti-
shuttling provisions. Article IV(e) states that where a prisoner is taken from the 
sending state to the receiving state and returned without trial that the receiving 
state's information shall be dismissed with prejudice. IAD Art. IV(e). See also, 
Esola and Sorrell. Even a one-day transport from one sovereign's custody to 
another, without trial, violates anti-shuttling provisions and merits dismissal 
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with prejudice. United States v. Schrum, 638 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1981). Given 
that Mr. Swenson was legally in the custody of the federal government, the State's 
numerous custodial transports to this Court for pretrial hearings (arraignment, roll 
call, preliminary hearing, district court arraignment and motion hearings) violate 
the anti-sirittling provisions in that Mr. Swenson was transported in the State's 
custody without trial and returned to federal custody. 
This Court should also dismiss this case simply because the State violated 
the IAD. In United States v. Reed, 910 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1990), the defendant was 
in custody of the State of Oregon when the United States placed a detainer upon 
him. The Oregon jailer did not understand the instructions on the IAD detainer 
forms with the result that the prisoner was unable to file his request for speedy 
trial, but was told that he had. Id. at 623. Because of the federal detainer, Reed 
was denied access to certain programs in the Oregon prison. Id. Although the 
federal government failed to comply with the IAD time limits, the trial court 
initially denied Reed's motion for dismissal because he had not filed the requisite 
speedy trial dismissal along with receipt of his detainer, as the IAD requires. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit ruled: 
Article IX of the Act states, "[t]his agreement shall be liberally 
construed so as to effectuate its purposes." Because of the severity 
of the remedy, a prisoner must strictly comply with the formal notice 
requirements of the Act.. . .Nevertheless, in cases where the 
government has failed to meet its obligations, and the prisoner has 
attempted, but through no fault of her own failed to comply with the 
technical requirements of the Act, the IAD's remedial provisions 
still apply. 
U.S. v. Reed, 910 F.2d at 624, citations omitted 
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In the instant case, the appellant was brought to Salt Lake City's Third District 
Court for prosecution. Though his custody status has not changed since September 
13, 2006, the Salt Lake prosecutor properly filed a motion to transport. The 
District Judge ordered Writ of Habeus Corpus Ad Prosequendum (See See 
Addendum "D" Case No.061906125), which clearly States "Swenson" is in 
"custody and control of the Attorney General of the United States." 
The appellant can only reason the there is some mandate that caused the 
Salt Lake City's Third District Court prosecutor to file a motion to obtain this writ, 
presumably to obtain legal jurisdiction. Furthermore, it would seem certain that 
the Cache County Prosecutor would be bound by the same set of laws mandating 
that he too must acquire legal jurisdiction before prosecuting the same defendant, 
Mr. Swenson. 
On September 17, 2006, even after the appellant filed a pre-trial motion to 
dismiss for violation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers, the appellant re-filed 
the Motion and stated that the had State failed to obtain jurisdiction over the 
appellant in order to prosecute him for the offense. To the appellant's dismay, the 
State continued to demonstrate its indifference to the rules, by bringing him to 
stand trial on both September 18 and 19,2006. If one is to rely on Lowery V. 
Estelle, 696 F.2d 333 (5th cir. 1983) They must conclude the States failure to 
obtain custody of the defendant, before conducting a trial, was a violation of due 
process under the 5 and 14 amendments. 
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The trial court denied the abovementioned motion, stating he didn't see 
how bail relinquished custody. The appellant believes that Addenda "B" and "D" 
of this motion, provided the trial court with ample evidence of the defendant's 
Federal custody, to not only grant the motion, but to reconsider his ruling on the 
above mentioned pre-trial motion. 
IL The trial court erred when they denied the defendant's motion 
to suppress evidence. 
The trial court erred when it failed to suppress evidence obtained from the 
defendant's truck linking him to the burglary when the officer had no probable 
cause or permission to search the vehicle. Mr. Swenson was detained when the 
officer search his vehicle without his permission. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution generally requires 
law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant before conducting a search. See U.S. 
Constitution Amendment IV. However, there is one exception to this general rule. 
It is known as the "automobile exception". If a car is readily mobile and probable 
cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits 
police to search the vehicle without more cause. Marylane v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 
467 (1999). In Mr. Swenson's case there was no dispute that the defendant's 
vehicle was mobile, and therefore the resolution of the motion depended upon 
whether the officer had probable cause to believe his car contained evidence 
linking him to the burglary before searching it. It is the appellant's contention that 
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the officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his vehicle without 
probable cause. 
The officer did not have probable cause to search the vehicle based merely 
on the fact that he had seen some burglar tools and gloves at the Top Stop. 
Probable cause requires a belief, reasonably arising out of the circumstances 
known to the seizing authority. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986). 
Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that 
the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief that certain items may be contraband or ...useful as evidence of a crime; it 
does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than 
false. A practical, non-technical probability that incriminating evidence is 
involved is all that is required.... The evidence thus collected must be seen and 
weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those 
versed in the field of law enforcement 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). 
The validity of the probable cause determination is made from the objective 
standpoint of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer... guided by his 
experience and training. Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088 id. The automobile exception 
only applies to searches of vehicles supported by probable cause. The officer's 
reasonable suspicions only authorize him at that time to further detain the vehicles 
occupants and investigate the circumstances more fully in an effort to confirm or 
dispel his suspicions. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
The officer admits he is not sure whether the person he detained had 
anything to do with the burglary. However, he still entered the appellant's truck in 
order to find evidence linking him to the burglary. The officer should have waited 
and followed the proper procedures for his investigation rather than illegally 
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searching the appellant's vehicle without probable cause. All items found in the 
truck should have been excluded from evidence. The trial court should have 
suppressed this evidence. Wherefore the Appellant requests that he be given a 
new trial and the evidence obtained from the truck be excluded from his new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The State effectively kidnapped Mr. Swenson to bring him into State 
custody. One wonders what this Court's response would be if the U.S. Marshal's 
office walked into the Cache County Jail without papers, authorization, or any sort 
of permission and abducted a prisoner to answer charges in federal court. The trial 
court should not have ignored established federal and state statutes and case law. 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Swenson respectfully requests this Court overturn 
the trial court's denial of his Motion to Dismiss. 
The appellant contends the trial court erred by not following the Federal 
and State laws requiring a sovereign to follow certain procedures to obtain custody 
of a defendant from another sovereign, regardless of whether the defendant is a 
pre-trial, pre-sentence, or even a parole violator detainee. Federal and State statute 
mandates some vehicle, besides kidnapping, for this purpose. The court needs to 
reconcile, why the Third District felt the need to obtain a writ while the First 
District did not. 
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Furthermore, the trial court erred when they allowed into evidence the 
items located in the defendant's truck because they had no probable cause to 
search the vehicle and did not have the defendant's permission to do so. 
DATED this /d~ day of September, 2008 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT postage prepaid to the Attorney General's Office, 160 
East 300 South, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140814, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 






In the First Judicial District Court 
In and for Cache County, State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON, 
Defendant(s). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case Number: 061100748 FS 
JUDGE: GORDON J. LOW 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Jurisdiction filed on December 1, 2006. The record should reflect that on the 19th day of 
October 2006, the Defendant was convicted by a jury of his peers of two counts of burglary, two 
counts of criminal mischief, two counts of theft, and one count of unlawful possession of 
burglary tools. Thereafter, the Defendant filed the instant motion. 
The matter was set for sentencing on December 4, 2006 and the Defendant's motion 
intervened. The Court has now received the motion, the State's response and the Defendant's 
reply. The motion is denied. 
Sentencing in this matter is set for the 5th of March, 2007 at 1:30 p.m. 
Dated this 22^
 day of ^bY\JW\, 2ktfk 





CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 061100748 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail DAVID M PERRY 
Attorney DEF 
14 W 100 N 
LOGAN, UT 84321 
Mail JAMIE M SWINK 
Attorney PLA 
199 N MAIN 
LOGAN UT 84321 
Dated t h i s ^ > day of V^h^Aavvj , 2ccq-
^Deputy Courts Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
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U.S. Depar tment of Justice 
United Stales Marshals Service 
DETAINER 
BASED ON VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND/OR SUPERVISED RELEASE 
UNITED STATES MARSHAL 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
Please type or print neatly; 
TO: CACHE COUNTY JAIL 
ATTN: BOOKING/DETAINERS 
1225 W VALLEY VIEW, STE #100 
LOGAN. UT 84321 
DATE: SEPTEMBER /, 2C06 





Please accept this Detainer against the above-named subject who is currently in your custody. The United Stales 
District Court for the District of UTAH has issued an arrest 
w a r r a n t charging the subject with violation of the conditions of probation and/or supervised release. 
Prior to the subject's release from your custody, please notify this office at once so that we may assume custody if 
necessary. If ihe subject is transferred from your custody to another detention facility, we request that you forward 
our Detainer to said facility at the time of transfer and advise this office as soon as possible. 
The notice and speedy trial requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act do NOT applv to this 
Detainer, which is based on a Federal probation/supervised release violation wa r r an t . 
Please acknowledge receipt of this Detainer, in addition, piease provide one copy of the Detainer to the subject 
and return one '*opy of the Detainer to this office in the enclosed self-addressed envelope. 
Very truly yours, 
RANDALL D. ANDERSON 
United States Marshal 
BY: LAURA JOHNSON / 
INVESTIGATIVE RESEARCH SPECI 
( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 4 - 3 4 0 4 
( 8 0 J ) 5 2 4 - 5 1 3 4 FAX 





Case No: 061100748 
Date: Sep 12, 2006 
10. MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY TOOLS - Class B Misdemeanor 
HEARING 
COUNT: 2:34 
Court calls the case. Warrant is recalled. Cache County Jail has 
Federal Marshall hold. Bail is re-instated for $57,000.00. 
Preliminary Hearing is set for 09/19/06® 11:00. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 09/19/2006 
Time: 11:00 a.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 5 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
13 5 NORTH 100 WEST 
LOGAN, UT 84321 
before Judge GORDON J LOW 







IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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vs 
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Transcript of Motion to Continue Preliminary Hearing. 
Honorable Gordon J. Low presiding 
First District Court Courthouse 
Logan, Utah 
September 19, 2006 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
JAMES M. SWINK 
D e p u t y C o u n t y A t t o r n e y 
DAVID M. PERRY 
A t t o r n e y a t Lav* 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
R e g i s t e r e d P r o f e s s i o n a l R e p o r t e r 
F i r s t D i s t r i c t C o u r t 
P . 0 . Box 873 
Brigham City, UT 84302-0873 
COPY 
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1 THE COURT: State of Utah versus Kendall Rosell 
2 Swenson. This matter is on the calendar for a preliminary 
3 hearing this morning. 
4 The charges against the defendant are possession or use 
5 of a controlled substance in a drug free zone with priors, a 
6 first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 
7 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) . That charge is that the defendant, on or 
8 about the 16th of August, 2006, having been previously 
9 convicted of unlawful possession or use of a controlled 
10 substance, did knowingly or intentionally possess or use 
11 methamphetamine, a controlled substance, within a thousand 
12 feet of a school. 
13 Counts two and three charge burglary, that on or about 
14 the same date and place as count one the defendant did enter 
15 and remain unlawfully in a building, or a portion of a 
16 building, with the intent to commit a felony. 
17 Counts four and five charge criminal mischief, third 
18 degree felonies, in violation of 76-6-106(2) (c) (d), that he 
19 did on the same date and place intentionally damaqe, deface 
20 or destroy the property of another and that the actor's 
21 conduct caused or was intended to cause pecuniary loss in 
22 excess of a thousand dollars but less than $5,000. 
I 
23 Count six charges possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
24 class A misdemeanor, in violation of 58-37a-5 (1) . Count 
25 three -- excuse me, count seven charges theft, a third degree 
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1 felony, in violation of 76-6-404. That the defendant did on 
2 or about the same date and place exercise unauthorized 
3 control over the property of another with the intent to 
4 deprive the owner thereof, and the actor had twice before 
5 been convicted of theft or any robbery or any burglary with 
6 intent to commit a theft. 
7 Counts eight and nine charge receiving stolen property, 
8 both third degree felonies, both on the same date and place 
9 J as one through seven. They charge that the defendant 
10 received or retained or disposed of the property of anothei 
11 knowing that the property had been stolen, or believing it 
12 had probably been stolen or concealed, sold, wilhheld or 
13 aided in concealing, selling, withholding the property 
14 knowing that the property had been stolen and intending tc 
15 deprive the owner thereof. And the value of that property 
16 exceeded a thousand dollars but was less than $5,000. And, 
17 again, he had been twice before convicted of theft. 
18 J Count ten charges unlawful possession of buiglary tools, 
19 J a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 76-6-202. 
20 Those are the charges against the defendant. Are both 
21 sides ready to proceed9 
22 MR. SWINK: The state is, Your Honor. 
23 MR. PERRY: Your Honoi, Mr. Swenson would like to 
24 have a continuance of this hearing. The last time we were 
25 here the court reinstated his bond and the jail, though, i-
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1 not acknowledging that order. They're saying he still has to 
2 post another $57,000 bail. He does have -- there's a federal 
3 hold on him and he wants to confer with his federal attorney, 
4 and he hasn't had an opportunity to do so, to see what impact 
5 these charges may have on his federal charge. 
6 For those reasons we are asking the court to maybe 
7 reissue its order reinstating the bond. He was in jail when 
8 the warrant got issued. He's not prepared to proceed today 
9 and we'd just like a continuance, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Let me see if I understand what you've 
11 said. This court reinstated the bond of $57,000. Has he 
12 posted that bond? 
13 MR. PERRY: Yeah. He posted that previously. 
14 THE COURT: And he's being held on a federal hold? 
15 MR. PERRY: There's a federal hold and ho has a 
16 federal attorney that's dealing with that and he wants to 
17 confer with him on that. 
18 THE COURT: What do you mean the jail is not 
19 complying with the $57,000? 
20 MR. PERRY: He wrote them a letter saying why 
21 haven't you released me on this charge and they're saying you 
22 are currently housed for $57,000 bail reinstatement on FTA. 
2 3 MR. SWINK: Judge --
24 MR. PERRY: So your bail is not clear. 

























with -~ first of all, let me respond this way. I have talked 
with the jail on this matter. They called me yesterday, 
Sergeant Terry Duncan. She reported that he's not being held 
on this $57,000 bond. He's met that. But there was a 
federal hold. 
THE COURT: That's what I assume was the case. 
MR. SWINK: That is what is holding him. The state 
would -- we won't object to the motion to continue, but we 
would ask the court to withdraw the bail. The defendant 
should not be released on bail for these reasons. First of 
all, the defendant has a long criminal history, Judge. I can 
give that to the court. There are numerous property crimes, 
burglaries and thefts. There was a failure to appear out of 
Salt Lake County for a retail theft. He failed to appear 
before Your Honor on the 28th day of August. The thing that 
brought him before Your Honor was that he was picked up on 
that failure to appear and he showed up on September 11. 
The state has concerns, Judge. Were we to put on the 
evidence today, the court would see that there is a long list 
and litany of the defendant breaking into properties. The 
evidence would show today that the defendant broke forcefully 
into L.W.'s on Tenth North and Main Street in Logan. He had 
a number of burglary tools that he was using. There were 
bolt cutters, a saw that he used to try to get into an ATM. 
He had a big mallet. There were a number of burglary tools 
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1 that were retrieved. 
2 He also had -- there was another burglary that night at 
3 Papa Murphy's in Logan. He had a computer from that store. 
4 He had a duffle bag that contained CDs from that store and 
5 other property belonging to them. 
6 The defendant -- there's also some history in Salt Lake. 
7 J There was a Papa Murphy's broke into down there and he had 
gift certificates from that store. 
9 I THE COURT: Before you go to the strength of the 
10 evidence, what's going on in the federal court? Why the 
11 federal hold? Is he on parole, are there charges pending? 
12 MR. SWINK: He's on probation with them, Judge. 
13 It's a probation violation is the information I got from 
14 Sergeant Duncan. 
15 THE COURT: Well, under those circumstances the 
16 defendant does not have a right to bail. Your request that 
17 it be revoked will not be granted, but it will be stayed 
18 temporarily. There will be no release on bail temporarily 
19 until we can conduct a bail hearing. So the $57,000 bail is 
20 not available right now. He will not be released on that. 
21 I'll set a bail hearing, Mr. Perry, so we can conduct that 
22 relative to his conditions of release on the $57,000 bail 
23 previously set. 
24 The state has that right. If in fact they can show, 







































assume you're not p 
der 77-2L et sequentes, then that will be 
But in the meantime I'll do that 
can we have a bail hearing? 
Thursday. 
What time? 
Any time m the morning. 
I'm setting that, Mr. Perry, because I 
repared to address the issues of bail just 
raised by Mr. Swink. On the other hand, I think it's 
appropriate to raise those issues of bail based upon your 
request for a continuance today. Absent that continuance, 
Mr. Swink suggests his evidence is sufficient to establish a 
basis for revocation. 
MR. PERRY: What tune? 
THE CLERK: 11:00. 
MR. SWINK: I assume that that's the prelimmaiy 
hearing at that time as well. 
THE COURT: The state has the right to proceed with 
the preliminary hearing, Mr. Perry, and I'm not sure why 
you're resisting that. The preliminary hearing is for the 
state's benefit as well. They have the right to proceed. 
I'm not sure what the delay is going to be for. He has 
counsel here. The evidence I'm going to be concerned aboit 
in the bail hearing will be largely that which I expect would 
be presented in the preliminary hearing in any event because 
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1 the state wants to present evidence, I assume from their 
2 motion, that he does not qualify for bail nor should bail be 
3 granted. 
4 THE DEFENDANT: May I speak, \our Honor'? 
5 I THE COURT: Yes. 
THE DEFENDANT: You made an order on the 11th 
reinstating my bond. 
THE COURT: I'm staying that order. 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that. But over the 
10 I last eight days have I been in federal custody or state 
11 I custody9 
12 THE COURT: I have no idea. 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Because you made that or ler does 
14 that become -- does my custody become valid at th time of 
15 that order or the time that the jail follows that order? 
16 THE COURT: I don't know, Mr. Swenson. But it 
17 you're on a federal hold, it's neither here nor there, it 
18 doesn't matter, because you are still in jail. 
19 THE DEFENDANT: I understand that I'm going to be in 
20 jail. I'm not trying to get out of jail. What I'm trying Lo 
21 do is postpone the state charges so I may be picked up by the 
22 marshals and taken down and appointed my attorney 
J 
23 THE COURT: Right. And ITm not going to do that now 
24 based upon the motion made by your attorney for a continuance 
25 and based upon the representations made by Mr. Swank until we 
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can conduct a bail hearing this Thursday. 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that, sir. I just want 
to let everybody know I'm not trying to get out on the 
street. That's not my intention in posting bail. My intent 
is to get down to the marshal's office on my marshal's hold. 
The reason for that is I'm not going to shake this, it's 
because I would like to get credit against my federal 
sentence. I do have two years I owe the feds. I would like 
to be getting credit for the days I'm in jail. 
THE COURT: Are you on federal parole right now? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I'm on probation and I'm 
on a probation violation. I will not be getting released. I 
will be getting sentenced. 
THE COURT: I can understand why you want to get 
down there. On the other hand, I think a delay of the 
preliminary hearing is detrimental to the state. I'm not 
17 I sure it's detriment to you, but it is to the state. I'm no+-
18 sure why we shouldn't proceed with the preliminary hearing in 
19 any event. We'll talk about that Thursday for the purpose of 
20 resetting the bail or revocation of the bail. In any event, 
21 until then, the order issued earlier setting the bail at 
22 $57,000 by reinstatement is stayed. See you all Thursday 
23 morning at 11:00. 


































THIS IS TO CERTIFY t h a t t h e v i d e o t a p e d h e a r i n g was 
t r a n s c r i b e d by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a C e r t i f i e d C o u r t 
R e p o r t e r and C e r t i f i e d Court Tape T r a n s c r i b e r i n and fo r 
t h e S t a t e of U tah . 
T h a t a f u l l , t r u e and c o r r e c t t r a n s c r i p t i o n of t h e 
h e a r i n g , t o t h e b e s t of my a b i l i t y , i s s e t f o r t h i n t h e 
p a g e s numbered 2 t o 9, i n c l u s i v e . 
I f u r t h e r c e r t i f y t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l t r a n s c r i p t was 
f i l e d w i t h t h e Cour t C le rk , F i r s t D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Cache 
C o u n t y , Logan, Utah . 
Dated t h i s 16th day of November, 2 0 0 6 . 
Rodney M. Fe l shaw, C . S . R . , R .P .R . 
ADDENDUM D 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ANGELA F. MICK LOS. 6229 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 Broadwa} Centre, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE. STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
-vs-
KENDALL ROSELL SWENSON. 
Defendant. 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD 
PROSEQUENDUM 
Case No. 061906125 
JUDGE 
TO: THE HONORABLE RANDALL ANDERSON, UNITED STATES MARSHAL 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, AND TO ANY OTHER UNITED STATES 
MARSHAL, AND TO ANY AUTHORIZED OFFICER IN WHOSE CUSTODY THE 
DEFENDANT MAY BE HELD: 
G R E E T I N G S : 
WE COMMAND that you bring the body of Kendall Rosell Swenson, of whom you now 
have custody and control on behalf of the Attorney General of the United States, before 
Matheson Courthouse. 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Tuesday, the 21st day of 
November, 2006, at 9*30 AM for Roll Call before the Honorable Judge Robert K. 1 Elder in 
Courtroom S-34 of the Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, so 
that said Defendant may appear therein as a defendant in the charges against him there pending; 
and immediately after said Defendant's case has been heard, that \ou return said Defendant to 
ni 
NOV '! 5 2GQ8 
the institution and place wheie he was confined undei safe and secuic conduct and >ou ha\c 
then and there this Wut 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to setvc a certified cop> of this Wut on said Shcnlf 
Superintendent, or custodian of an> institution wheiein said Defendant is now i. on fined 
DATED this /£) dav of November. 2006 




warrant; is that correct? 
A. I'm sorry, repeat that again. 
Q. The backup officer is the one who inquired as to the 
defendant's identity and discovered the existence of the 
outstanding warrant? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Perry, any questions? 
MR. PERRY: Yes, Your Honor. 
Q. (BY MR. PERRY) The truck was loud? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. The engine was running, though? 
A. Yes. 
Q. A diesel? 
A. Yes. I'm assuming it was a diesel. It's a semi truck. 
MR. PERRY: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Any further 
argument, Mr. Perry? 
MR. PERRY: What I'm able to gather from this 
hearing is that Mr. Swenson was in custody at the time that 
Officer Hansen peered through the window of the truck, broke 
the plane of the truck, put his hand in the tiuck and saw the 
glove and then proceeded with further detention. 
THE COURT: He was. I would find that the defendant 
24 I was in custody at the time Officer Hansen looked in the 
25 truck. He was on the ground by order of a police officer who 
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had held a Tazer to him before that and turned him over to a 
backup officer. However, I also find that that stop was 
justifiable. 
The circumstances of this case are not with respect to 
the search of the vehicle. The circumstances that need to be 
viewed by this court are whether or not the stop from a level 
one to a level two to where we are now was in fact 
appropriate. Here, given all of the circumstances which this 
court has to consider, we have the following. One, the 
defendant was in the location of the called in or -- the 
called in burglary or the burglary alarm area. He said he'd 
been jogging north on Main Street, but he'd not been seen 
doing that. He was then seen in the truck. As the officer 
walked toward the truck he exited the truck with his hands in 
the air. No reasonable person would do that under the 
circumstances of the facts I've heard, unless there was some 
concern about his being there inappropriately. 
He then did not stop when told to by the officer. It was 
at that point he was told to sit on the ground. At that 
point he was in custody. This court, however, finds under 
the circumstances attendant in the officer's mind there was 
nothing inappropriate about that action. That was 
justifiable. It's articulable suspicion of the defendant. 
And the officer had every right to hold him and further 
inquire relative to his presence there and his actions. The 
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actual inquiry took place by the hand of another officer and 
once the warrant was discovered the matter is resolved. 
As a matter of fact, apparently the glove being 
discovered is only incidental to the other articulable 
circumstances. Nor do I find that looking through the window 
and seeing the gloves and identifying those as consistent 
with those at the scene are necessarily inappropriate. But 
that occurred after the defendant was already in custody. 
The defendant was already in custody when Officer Hansen 
looked through the window. 
I would find that there was articulable suspicion to 
continue that custodial arrangement until further 
investigation occurred, which was then buttressed by him 
looking through the window. But more importantly, then, 
confirmed by the search -- by the arrest warrant being 
discovered. 
So, irrespective of whether the glove was seen or not 
seen by Officer Hansen, the defendant was already in custody 
of the police officers, already legally in custody, and 
constitutionally in custody. And once the existence of the 
warrant was discovered anything thereafter was a search 
incident to an arrest, sufficient for an inventory purpose 
and consistent with further investigation of the burglary of 
the service station. Motion to suppress is denied. 
MR. PERRY: Your Honor, the next motion is the 
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Docket Text | 
Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed, assigned to Judge Bruce S. 
Jenkins Receipt no.: 110843 (Entered: 03/12/2001) | 
Motion by Charles Dennis Friedman for appointment of counsel J 
(Entered: 03/12/2001) j 
Order of Reference signed by JTG (in the temporaiy absence of Judge 
Jenkins) 4/9/01, 636(b)(1)(A). The magistrate is to hear and determine 
the pending petition for habeas corpus and should hold an expedited hrg 
before 4/13/01 (which is the day the state court has indicated its inlent to 
sentence the petnr on state charges), cc: atty (ce) (Entered: 04/09/2001) 
Case referred to Judge Ronald N. Bovce cc: art)' (ce) (Entered: J 
04/09/2001) ' 1 
Case referred to magistrate under 28:636(b)(l)(A). (ce) (Entered: 
04/09/2001) | 
Order granting [2-1] motion for appointment of couns* 1 signed by Tudge 
Bruce S. Jenkins, 4/6/01. Deirdre A. Gorman is appt c lsl for petnr. 
cc:atty (ce) (Entered- 04/09/2001) J 
Magistrate Notice of Hearing status conference set for 10:30 4/13/01 To 
be held before Judge Boyce cc:atty (Ntc generated by: RNB's chambers) 
(ce) (Entered: 04/10/2001) | 
Order of Reference signed by JTG, 4/10/01, 636(b)(1)(B). Mag to handle 1 
case up to and incl R&R on any dispositive matters. The mag should hold 
an expedited hrg before 4/13/01, the date the State court has indicated its 
intent to sentence the petnr on state charges, cc: atty (ce) (Entered: 
1 04/11/2001) J 
Request for Ruling by petitioner Charles Dennis Friedman RE: [2-1 ] 
| motion for appointment of counsel (alt) (Entered: 04/12/2001) | 
Minute entry. Counsel for both parties present. Based upon the 
information by Ms. Gorman regarding the status of the petitioner in the 
state court system, the court will recommend that the petition for writ of 1 
habeas corpus under 28:2254 be dismissed without prejudice for being 
filed prematurely. Petition has been filed without exhausting all of the 
state remedies. A report and recommendation will be prepared and 
1 submitted to Judge Jenkins expeditiously. Court adjourned, status 
conference : Judge: Ronald N. Boyce Court Reporter: Electronic Tape 
No.: 2052 & 2053 Log 6075-223 Court Deputy: Arindrea Bowers (asb) 
j (Entered: 04/13/2001) J 
Report and Recommendations of Judge Ronald N. Boyce. The court 
recommends that the Petition for Habeas corpus of Charles Friedman 
should be Dismissed w/o prejudice, for his failure to exhaust his state 
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remedies. Objections to R and R due by 5/3/01 cc:atty (ksp) (Entered: 
04/23/2001) J 
Order adopting [10-1] report and recommendations, dismissing case 
signed by Judge Bruce S. Jenkins. 5/1/01 cc:attv (alt) (Entered: 1 
05/01/2001) 1 
CASE NO LONGER REFERRED TO Judge Ronald N. Boyce (alt) 1 
(Entered: 05/01/2001) | 
Case closed per order no. 11 (alt) (Entered: 05/23/2001) 
Obj ections by Charles Dennis Friedman [10-1] report and 1 
recommendations (alt) (Entered: 05/04/2001) | 
Request for evidentiary hrg filed by Charles Dennis Friedman re: [1-1] 
petition (alt) (Entered: 05/04/2001) | 
Motion by Charles Dennis Friedman to stay all state ct proceedings 
concerning Petitioner pending final determination of his Petition (alt) 
(Entered: 05/04/2001) j 
Notice of Hearing filed: Motion hearing set for 2:00 5/18/01 for [14-1] 
motion to stay all state ct proceedings concerning Petitioner pending final 
determination of his Petition To be held before Judge BSJ cc:atty (Ntc 
generated by: BSJ's secy, KS) (alt) (Entered: 05/07/2001) ] 
Motion by Charles Dennis Friedman to vacate [11-1] order dismissing 
case (alt) (Entered: 05/10/2001) | 
Motion by Charles Dennis Friedman for issuance of subps to Dep. Martin 
Monks & Lana Taylor, Esq. for hrg scheduled 5/18/01 at 2:00 (alt) 
(Entered: 05/10/2001) | 
Order granting [17-1] motion for issuance of subps to Dep. Martin 
Monks & Lana Taylor, Esq. for hrg scheduled 5/18/01 at 2:00 signed by 
1 Judge Ronald N. Boyce, 5/11/01 cc:atty (alt) (Entered: 05/14/2001) | 
Memorandum by Aaron D. Kennard in opposition to [14-1 ] motion to 
stay all state ct proceedings concerning Petitioner pending final 
determination of his Petition, also in obj to [1 -1 ] petition for habeas 
1 corpus (alt) (Entered: 05/14/2001) | 
Return of service executed re: subp served upon Deputy Martin Munks 
J 5/16/01 (alt) (Entered: 05/17/2001) | 
Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum issued (mrw) (Entered: 
105/18/2001) | 
Order granting [16-1] motion to vacate [11-1] order dismissing case 
signed by Judge Bruce S. Jenkins, 5/18/01 cc:atty (alt) (Entered: 
105/21/2001) 1 
J Minute entry: Petitioner, Chrles Friedman present on Writ of HC Ad 
Test. Argument & discussion heard. Witness(es) called, sworn, & testify. 
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Evidence marked, offered, & received. Cross-examination. Crt rules: 
granting [16-1] motion to vacate [11-1] order dismissing case; mooting 
[14-1] motion to stay all state ct proceedings concerning Petitioner 
pending final determination of his Petition, By stip of cnsl, Crt deems I 
matters as on Writ of HC. Parties have agreed upon matters to be decided 
by the Crt. , By stip of cnsl, documentation received as evidence., Dft 
appropriately in federal custody & State of Utah will have to Writ out of 
federal custody for further proceedings Crt has not dealt with credit for 
time served issue. Ms. Gorman to prepare & submit order. Defendant, 
Charles Friedman deemed in Primary Custody effective 2/13/2000, 
pending final execution & return of Judgment and Commitment. Judge: 
BSJ Court Reporter: Reeve Butler Court Deputy: Michael R. Weiler 
(mrw) (Entered: 05/22/2001) | 
Order, Defendant, Charles Friedman deemed in Primary Custody 
(federal) effective Febaruary 13th, 2000, pending final execution and 
return of Judgment and Commitment signed by Judge Bruce S. Jenkins , 
5/18/2001 cc:atty (mrw) (Entered: 05/22/2001) J 
Petitioner's Exliibits 1 & 2 (see Min Entry docket #23) lodged on left-side 
of case record (mrw) (Entered: 05/22/2001) 
Case reopened per order no. 22 (alt) (Entered: 05/23/2001) 1 
Writ of HC ad testificandum executed re: Charles D. Friedman, 5/18/01. J 
(alt) (Entered: 05/23/2001) J 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law re: primary' custody signed by 
Judge Bruce S. Jenkins, 6/29/01 cc:atty (alt) (Entered: 07/02/2001) | 
Order that Pet be deemed in primary federal custody since 2/13/00; that 
Pet is now properly in physical custody of USMS & is a federal prisoner; 
the UT, to process st cakrges against Pet, must follow proper procedures 
& writ Pet out of federal custody & then return him to primary custody of 
USMS signed by Judge Bruce S. Jenkins, 6/29/01 cc:atty (alt) (Enlered: 
107/02/2001) " J 
Case closed per chmbrs, re: order no. 26 (alt) (Entered: 07/10/2001) 
CJA 20 Authorization to Pay Deirdre A. Gorman $5,050.89 Voucher No. 
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Case 2:01-cv-00158-BSJ Document 25 Filed 07/02/2001 Page 1 of 5 
DF.1RDRK A GORMAN ("3651) of 
FARR, KAUFMAN. SIJ1.UVAN, GORMAN. 
JENSF.N, MFDRKER, NICHOLS & PERKINS 
Attorneys tor Petitioner 
205 26* Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone (S01) 394-5526 
^'"•'i^keo 
r.lVFD 
li:f • 'I,C 
IN TKE \ JNITED STATES DISTRICT C O l ' j ^ ! C £ c). 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
CHARLES DENNIS FRIEDMAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AARON D. KENNARD, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS Or FACT AND 
/ CONCI .USIONS OF I .AW 
/ 
Case No. 01 CV 15,- J 
This matter was heard on May 18. 2001. pursuant to Petitioner's request for an 
evidentiary hearing Petitioner CHARLES DFNNIS FRIEDMAN was present with eoumel 
DEIRDRFA GORMAN Respondent wasnot present hut represented by counsel T .1 TSAKALOS. 
The Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus The Magistrate 
made a preliminary finding recommending that Petitioner's request for a writ be dcr ted Pet ilioner, 
through appointed counsel filed an objection to the Magistrate's recommendation. The Respondent 
filed an objection to the Petitioner's request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
# 
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FRIEDMANV KENNARD -CaseNo 01 CV 158J 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofhaw 
The Court, having taken lesti mony, hearing proffers and argument by the parties, and 
admitting exhibits submitted by the Pet i tinner, now makes the following Findings of Fact. 
1. That the prior Order of Dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is 
vacated. 
2. That the parties agree thai the issues would not change i flhc technical procedures 
were complied with and agree that the Court may deem the pleadings submitted by ihe Petitioner 
as if Ihey were in the nature ofa Writ oTHabeas Corpus and the Answer and Objection (lied by the 
Respondent arc as ifthey were a Return 
3. That the parties have requested that the Court, having this matter before n. decide 
the issue based upon the record 
4. The parties agree that the documents prepared by counselor for Petitioner, 
Exhibits 1 and 2, be received in evidence as factually accurate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF 1 AW 
1. That the Petitioner was appropriaiely w riled out of State custody for the purposes 
ofa proceeding in the United Stales Dislnct Court, before the Honorable Thomas Greene, on 
September 27, 1999, At that time, the Petitioner had been convicted ofa state charge of escape on 
August 26, 1999, and had been sentenced pursuant to that conviction for a one year period 
2, When the Petitioner was sentenced on October 17,2000, by United States District 
Court Judge Thomas Greene, to a period of 71 months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, the 
state term had expired by operation of law on February 13, 2000, 
? 
Case 2:01-cv~00158-BSJ Document 25 Filed 07/02/2001 Page 3 of 5 
FRIFDMAN V. KF.NNARD -CaseNo. 01 CV 158J 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I,aw 
3. That the primary custody of the Petitioner on October 17, 2000 was that of the 
United States. 
4 That although the Petitioner was improperly relumed to the physical custody of 
the State ofUtah at the time his federal sentence was imposed, the primary custody of the Petitioner 
remained with the United States. 
5. That the State olTJteh, to appropriately process the state charges, needs to writ 
out the .Petitioner from federal custody and then return Petitioner to the primary custodian of the 
United States. 
6, The Court has deah only with the question of the proper primary custody of the 
Petitioner. 
DATED this 9Jf day of June, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: / 
U.S. DlSTRTO^cW 
Approved as to form; 
T.jfiTSAKALOS 
Attorney for Respondent 
Case 2:01-cv-00158-BSJ Document 25 Filed 07/02/2001 Page 4 of 5 
FRIEDMAN V, KENNARD - Case No. 01 CV 158J 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following, postage prepaid this / f day of 
June, 2001: 
T.J. Tsakalos 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State Street, tfS3400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Secretary 
t41 
n:? • ol 
ADDENDUM G 
31 
Result #1: Utah Statutes - 77-29-"\ Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment into la... Page 1 of 5 
Utah Statutes 
G Utah Statutes 
Cl TITLE 77 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Q CHAPTER 29 DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 
77-29-5. I n t e r s t a t e agreement on d e t a i n e r s — Enactment i n t o law 
— Text o f agreement . 
The i n t e r s t a t e a g r e e m e n t on d e t a i n e r s i s h e r e b y e n a c t e d i n t o 3 aw and 
e n t e r e d i n t o by t h i s s t a t e w i t h a l l o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s l e g a l L y j o i n i n g 
t h e r e i n m t h e form s u b s t a n t i a l l y a s f o l l o w s : 
The c o n t r a c t i n g s t a t e s s o l e m n l y a g r e e t h a t : 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, 
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and 
difficulties m securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in 
other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of 
prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of 
the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the 
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of 
the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, 
informations or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings 
with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another 
jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operative 
procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such 
co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used m this agreement: 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States 
of America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of 
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is 
incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final 
dispositions pursuant to Article III hereof or at the time that a request 
for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state m which tria L is to be had 
on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or 
Article IV hereof. 
ARTICIE III 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment m a 
penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during 
the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending m any other 
party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis 
of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be 
brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be 
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the 
prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his 
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imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the 
indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown 
in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court 
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable 
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a 
certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, 
stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, 
the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the 
sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility 
of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to 
the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to 
in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the 
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of 
him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the 
appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified 
mail, return receipt requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having 
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and 
contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of 
his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, 
information or complaint on which the detainer is based. 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disporition of 
all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose 
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically 
directed. The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official 
having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate 
prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions wi.-hin the 
state to which the prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent 
of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent 
pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the 
prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not 
had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior 
to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such 
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or 
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with 
prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a 
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition 
with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included 
therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to 
the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after 
completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request 
for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to 
the production of his body in any court where his presence may be 
required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a 
further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original place of 
imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing 
in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence 
if otherwise permitted by law. 
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of 
the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof 
shall void the request. 
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ARTICLE IV 
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried 
indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have 
a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a 
term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with 
Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary 
custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in 
which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having 
jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly 
approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided further that 
there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate 
authorities before the request be honored, within which period the 
governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary 
custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the 
prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in 
paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in 
custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already 
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of 
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any 
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said 
authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and 
appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers 
against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing 
them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons 
therefor. 
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial 
shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arriva' of the 
prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, 
the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction 
of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any 
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his 
delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not 
be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the 
sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such 
delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information oi complaint 
contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the 
original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such 
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or 
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with 
prejudice. 
ARTICLE V 
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV 
hereof, the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to 
deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority 
in the state where such indictment, information or complaint is pending 
against such person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be 
had. If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the 
offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided 
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for m Article III of this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, 
the appropriate authority in the receiving state shall be entitled to 
temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the prisoner's 
presence m federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial 
arrangement may be approved by the custodian. 
(b) The officer or other representative of a stare accepting an offer 
of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand: 
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the 
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given. 
(2) A auly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint 
on the basis or which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of 
which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made. 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept 
temporary custody of said person, or m the event that an action on the 
indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer 
has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided m 
Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the 
jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been 
pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any 
detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect. 
(d) The temporary custody referred to m this agreement shall be only 
for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges 
contained m one or more untried indictments, informations or ccmplamts 
which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or tor prosecution on 
any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction Except 
for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any 
place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in 
a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting 
prosecution. 
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of 
this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. 
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner 
is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this 
agreement, time oeing served on the sentence shall continue to iun but 
good time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent 
that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence 
may allow. 
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as 
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to 
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending 
state and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same 
manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or m any 
other manner permitted by law. 
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner 
pursuant ro this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the 
territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or 
more untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or m 
which trial is bexng had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall 
also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the 
prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states 
concerned shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for 
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a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among 
themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or 
affect any internal relationship among the departments, agendes and 
officers of and m the government of a party state, or between a party 
state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or 
responsibilities therefor. 
ARTICLE VI 
(a) In determining tne duration and expiration dates of the 1 lme 
periods provided m Articles III and JV of this agreement, the running of 
said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the 
prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having 
jurisdiction of the matter. 
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by 
this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally 
ill. 
ARTICLE VII 
Each stare party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, 
acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate 
rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and 
provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, within and without 
the state, information necessary to the effective operation of ihis 
agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party 
state when such state has enacted the same into law. A state pa^ty to 
this agreement may withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the 
same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of 
any proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officeis at the 
time such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect t h e n rights m 
respect thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its 
purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any 
phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be 
contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States 
or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, perscn ^r 
circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder cf his 
agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person 
or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be 
held contrary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the 
agreement shall remain m full force and effect as to the remaining 
states and m full force and effect as to the state affected as to all 
severable matters. 
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